Lecture 8 – Solutions to Climate Change

April 18, 2024

… it is becoming increasingly apparent that far-reaching changes in lifestyles will be required, alongside shifts in policy, service provision and technological innovation, if we are to avoid dangerous levels of global heating, …

Newell et al. (2021) 1

Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)

Boehm & Schumer (Mon, 03/20/2023 - 09:00)

Preventing Carbon Emissions

Food Systems

Emerging food technologies such as cellular fermentation, cultured meat, plant-based alternatives to animal-based food products, and controlled environment agriculture, can bring substantial reduction in direct GHG emissions from food production (limited evidence, high agreement). These technologies have lower land, water, and nutrient footprints, and address concerns over animal welfare. Realising the full mitigation potential depends on access to low-carbon energy as some emerging technologies are relatively more energy intensive.

Pathak et al. (2022) 113

Mobility

[…] Electric vehicles powered by low-emissions electricity offer the largest decarbonisation potential for land-based transport, on a life cycle basis (high confidence). Sustainable biofuels can offer additional mitigation benefits in land-based transport in the short and medium term (medium confidence). Sustainable biofuels, low-emissions hydrogen, and derivatives (including synthetic fuels) can support mitigation of CO2 emissions from shipping, aviation, and heavy-duty land transport but require production process improvements and cost reductions (medium confidence). […]

Shukla et al. (2022) 32

Buildings

design for evolving needs with what already exists

construct with low-emission materials for high efficiency using renewable energy

optimise use and energy supply

recycle and reuse

Shukla et al. (2022) 28

Integrated design approaches to the construction and retrofit of buildings have led to increasing examples of zero energy or zero carbon buildings in several regions. However, the low renovation rates and low ambition of retrofitted buildings have hindered the decrease of emissions. Mitigation interventions at the design stage include buildings typology, form, and multi-functionality to allow for adjusting the size of buildings to the evolving needs of their users and repurposing unused existing buildings to avoid using GHG-intensive materials and additional land. Mitigation interventions include: at the construction phase, low-emission construction materials, highly efficient building envelope and the integration of renewable energy solutions;58 at the use phase, highly efficient appliances/equipment, the optimisation of the use of buildings and their supply with low-emission energy sources; and at the disposal phase, recycling and re-using construction materials. (high confidence)

(Shukla et al., 2022, p. 28)

In 2014, the buildings sector accounted for 31% of total global final energy use, 54% of final electricity demand, and 8% of energy-related CO2 emissions (excluding indirect emissions due to electricity). When upstream electricity generation is taken into account, buildings were responsible for 23% of global energy-related CO2 emissions, with one-third of those from direct fossil fuel consumption (IEA, 2017a) . (https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/chapter-2?)/

Industry

Net zero CO2 industrial-sector emissions are possible but challenging (high confidence). Energy efficiency will continue to be important. Reduced materials demand, material efficiency, and circular economy solutions can reduce the need for primary production.

Pathak et al. (2022) 104

The use of steel, cement, plastics, and other materials is increasing globally, and in most regions. There are many sustainable options for demand management, materials efficiency, and circular material flows that can contribute to reduced emissions, but how these can be applied will vary across regions and different materials. These options have a potential for being more used in industrial practice and would need more attention from industrial policy. These options, as well as new production technologies, are generally not considered in recent global scenarios nor in national economy-wide scenarios due to relative newness. As a consequence, the mitigation potential in some scenarios is underestimated compared to bottom-up industry-specific models. (high confidence) {3.4, 5.3, Figure 5.7, 11.2, Box 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5.2, 11.6}

(Shukla et al., 2022)

Clean Energy

Reducing GHG emissions across the full energy sector requires major transitions, including a substantial reduction in overall fossil fuel use, the deployment of low-emission energy sources, switching to alternative energy carriers, and energy efficiency and conservation. The continued installation of unabated fossil fuel infrastructure will ‘lock-in’ GHG emissions. […]

Shukla et al. (2022) 28

break

… it is becoming increasingly apparent that far-reaching changes in lifestyles will be required, alongside shifts in policy, service provision and technological innovation, if we are to avoid dangerous levels of global heating, …

Newell et al. (2021) 1

Akenji et al. (2021) 43

Consumer or producer?

Both.

A stacked area chart. The title reads: The richest 1% are responsible for double the carbon emissions of the poorest 50%. The figure then displays the shares of the richest 1 and 10, 40 and poorest 50%

Gore (2020) 3

Reading Question

Who do you think the “polluter elite” are?

Are their lifestyles, or aspects of the lifestyles, something you find desirable? Why or why not?

Do you think others find them desirable?

If you do find them desirable, is it because of

status,
safety,
accomplishment,
jealousy,
hedonisitic,
other,

reasons?

… it is becoming increasingly apparent that far-reaching changes in lifestyles will be required, alongside shifts in policy, service provision and technological innovation, if we are to avoid dangerous levels of global heating, …

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994. Today, it has near-universal membership. The 198 countries that have ratified the Convention are called Parties to the Convention. Preventing “dangerous” human interference with the climate system is the ultimate aim of the UNFCCC.

What Is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change? | UNFCCC (n.d.) np

Biggest achievement: The legally binding Paris Agreement 2015

Composite graph of the climate stripes, showing increasing temperature and global climate conferences

Selected Policy Options

Addressing Market Failures

Taxes,

Emission Cap and Trade,

Subsidies

Regulatory

Choice editing

Protection and conservation of nature (forest, oceans, wetlands …)

Systemic

Degrowth,

Doughnut Economy

Who drives climate change policy?

Proyecto Glaciares_Laguna Palcacocha (59)

The header of a response from the Swedish Miljödepartment to the Aurora activists

Cooperación Suiza COSUDE/ via Flickr CC

Climate Change Litigation Databases

Summary

Figure 1

Otto et al. (2020)

Avoid Carbon Tunnel Vision

References

Akenji, L., Bengtsson, M., Toivio, V., Lettenmeier, M., Fawcett, T., Parag, Y., Saheb, Y., Coote, A., Spangenberg, J. H., Capstick, S., et al. (2021). 1.5 lifestyles: Towards a fair consumption space for all. Hot or Cool Institute.

Boehm, S., & Schumer, C. (Mon, 03/20/2023 - 09:00). 10 Big Findings from the 2023 IPCC Report on Climate Change.

Creutzig, F., Niamir, L., Bai, X., Callaghan, M., Cullen, J., Díaz-José, J., Figueroa, M., Grubler, A., Lamb, W. F., Leip, A., Masanet, E., Mata, É., Mattauch, L., Minx, J. C., Mirasgedis, S., Mulugetta, Y., Nugroho, S. B., Pathak, M., Perkins, P., … Ürge-Vorsatz, D. (2022). Demand-side solutions to climate change mitigation consistent with high levels of well-being. Nature Climate Change, 12(1), 36–46. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01219-y

Gore, T. (2020). Confronting Carbon Inequality: Putting climate justice at the heart of the COVID-19 recovery [{{OXFAM MEDIA BRIEFING}}]. OXFAM.

Newell, P., Twena, M., & Daley, F. (2021). Scaling behaviour change for a 1.5 degree world: Challenges and opportunities. Global Sustainability, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2021.23

Otto, I. M., Donges, J. F., Cremades, R., Bhowmik, A., Hewitt, R. J., Lucht, W., Rockström, J., Allerberger, F., McCaffrey, M., Doe, S. S. P., Lenferna, A., Morán, N., Vuuren, D. P. van, & Schellnhuber, H. J. (2020). Social tipping dynamics for stabilizing Earth’s climate by 2050. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(5), 2354–2365. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1900577117

Pathak, M., Slade, R., Shukla, P. R., Skea, J., Pichs-Madruga, R., & Ürge-Vorsatz, D. (2022). Technical summary. Cambridge University Press / Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.002

Shukla, P. R., Skea, J., Slade, R., Al Khourdajie, A., van Diemen, R., McCollum, D., Pathak, M., Some, S., Vyas, P., Fradera, R., Belkacemi, M., Hasija, A., Lisboa, G., Luz, S., & Malley, J. (Eds.). (2022). Summary for policymakers. In Climate change 2022: Mitigation of climate change. Contribution of working group III to the sixth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press.

What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change? | UNFCCC. (n.d.). https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change.

Appendix

Unit Cost of Mitigation Technologies Rapidly Declining

Unit cost reductions and use in some rapidly changing mitigation technologies. The top panel shows global costs per unit of energy (USD per MWh) for some rapidly changing mitigation technologies. Solid blue lines indicate average unit cost in each year. Light blue shaded areas show the range between the 5th and 95th percentiles in each year. Grey shading indicates the range of unit costs for new fossil fuel (coal and gas) power in 2020 (corresponding to USD55–148 per MWh). In 2020, the levelised costs of energy (LCOE) of the four renewable energy technologies could compete with fossil fuels in many places. For batteries, costs shown are for 1 kWh of battery storage capacity; for the others, costs are LCOE, which includes installation, capital, operations, and maintenance costs per MWh of electricity produced. The literature uses LCOE because it allows consistent comparisons of cost trends across a diverse set of energy technologies to be made. However, it does not include the costs of grid integration or climate impacts. Further, LCOE does not take into account other environmental and social externalities that may modify the overall (monetary and non-monetary) costs of technologies and alter their deployment. The bottom panel shows cumulative global adoption for each technology, in GW of installed capacity for renewable energy and in millions of vehicles for battery-electric vehicles. A vertical dashed line is placed in 2010 to indicate the change since AR5. Shares of electricity produced and share of passenger vehicle fleet are indicated in text for 2020 based on provisional data, i.e., percentage of total electricity production (for PV, onshore wind, offshore wind, CSP) and of total stock of passenger vehicles (for EVs). The electricity production share reflects different capacity factors; for example, for the same amount of installed capacity, wind produces about twice as much electricity as solar PV. {2.5, 6.4} Renewable energy and battery technologies were selected as illustrative examples because they have recently shown rapid changes in costs and adoption, and because consistent data are available. Other mitigation options assessed in the report are not included as they do not meet these criteria [@ipccps 12].

growth in the share of energy derived from low-carbon-emitting sources (including renewables, nuclear and fossil fuel with CCS) and a decline in the overall share of fossil fuels without CCS (Section 2.4.2.1), (ii) rapid decline in the carbon intensity of electricity generation simultaneous with further electrification of energy end-use (Section 2.4.2.2), and (iii) the growth in the use of CCS applied to fossil and biomass carbon in most 1.5°C pathways (Section 2.4.2.3).

Nuclear power increases its share in most 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot by 2050, but in some pathways both the absolute capacity and share of power from nuclear generators decrease (Table 2.15). There are large differences in nuclear power between models and across pathways (Kim et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2018) . One of the reasons for this variation is that the future deployment of nuclear can be constrained by societal preferences assumed in narratives underlying the pathways (O’Neill et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017b) . Some 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot no longer see a role for nuclear fission by the end of the century, while others project about 95 EJ yr−1 of nuclear power in 2100 (Figure 2.15).